The content of the analysis:

1. The final two weeks: what the news is all about

2. What is the campaign about?

3. What are the respective strategies of Fidesz and Tisza in the final weeks?

4. What do the numbers show?

5. Behind the scenes at Tisza

6. Behind the scenes at Fidesz

7. Who seems to have better chances?

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The final two weeks: what the news is all about

Several issues have come to light regarding the secret services: the Financial Times wrote about the Russian secret service intervening in the Hungarian elections on Orbán’s side; the Washington Post wrote about Russians advising the Hungarian government to stage a fake assassination attempt on Viktor Orbán; a friendly conversation between the Foreign Ministers of Hungary and Russia has been leaked; the government has filed charges against investigative journalist Szabolcs Panyi, accusing him of spying for Ukraine; and a senior police investigator has come forward publicly on how the government had sought to undermine the Tisza party using secret service tactics.

These are serious allegations on their own, and each must be independently investigated for any criminal activity. However, these developments, in general, have not altered the course of the campaign or the power dynamics.

This is because Tisza voters interpret everything as a sign of systemic corruption within the Orbán establishment, while Fidesz voters dismiss everything as “Ukrainian propaganda or intervention”. However, there could be consequences after the election if an investigation clarifies how the intelligence services participated in the campaign on one side or the other.

It is worth looking at the campaign events of recent weeks through the lens of how each side positions itself, and therefore, what tactics and methods it deems necessary.

What the campaign is about

“Facts are stubborn things. We are the greatest” – Viktor Orbán wrote on his Facebook page after his rally in Dunaújváros. In a surprise move, Orbán has started copying Péter Magyar’s tour of the country, and day after day, he himself compares the turnout at his events with his opponent’s events, using photos. And, of course, Orbán always sees himself as having the majority.

The current campaign of Viktor Orbán is unusual in two respects:

● On the one hand, over the past three elections, the Prime Minister held only closed events with pre-registered audiences, allowing him to keep counter-protesters away. That is now over: he has concluded that he needs to take risks and hold open campaign events to mobilize voters.

● On the other hand, in the past 16 years, the Prime Minister positioned himself above his domestic rivals: he never engaged with opposition parties, he refused to have a debate with leading opposition politicians, and avoided even uttering his opponents’ names. However, now, he is actively reacting, and testing his strength against Péter Magyar.

The main objective of Viktor Orbán’s tour of Hungary is to take photos from above, using drones. When visiting Eger, a town of 50 000 inhabitants in Northern Hungary, Viktor Orbán posted this photo in the evening:

Fidesz would like to reassure its voters, and make them feel that they are the majority. Furthermore, it wants the undecided voters to see Fidesz as the likely winner, and ultimately vote for the party.

Péter Magyar understands this perfectly, and did not let Orbán’s move go unanswered.

● In his own rallies, he repeatedly spoke about Orbán’s “Temu-style” tour of the country, suggesting that it is fake.

● According to Magyar, Orbán’s events are filled with “bused-in crowds and paid clappers”. He spoke about the “Fidesz Tours”. In Magyar’s opinion, the buses and the fuel are paid for by taxpayers, meaning that Fidesz is using public funds for this.

● At the same time, the most effective response to a photo is always another photo, and that is exactly what happened at the Eger event. The Tisza revealed the gaps within the crowd at Orbán’s rally with a single image.

CAPTION: Viktor Orbán’s photo, versus the reality

Cameras were turned off after this, but it is visible that the torches had already been lit.

The primary importance of photos and counter-photos in a campaign lies not in their factual accuracy, but in their existence ― and their ability to circulate. It is evident that the Tisza is competing effectively, using images to construct a different narrative regarding Viktor Orbán’s nationwide tour.

What are the respective strategies of Fidesz and Tisza in the final weeks?

As noted earlier, while the news of intervention by the secret services is grave, it hasn’t influenced the campaign. I believe the final few weeks should be viewed through the lens of positioning: where each party places itself, and the specific tactics and methods they choose to use.

Read more

1. What is the campaign about?

2. What do the numbers show?

3. Behind the scenes at Tisza

4. Behind the scenes at Fidesz

5. How does the new war affect the chances?

6. Who seems to be the frontrunner now?

Thank you for subscribing to the newsletter. If your company needs an invoice for the newsletter subscription, please write to dullszab@gmail.com and I can provide you with an invoice in Hungarian forints. Pay for three months in advance for 70,000 forints (180 euros).

What is the campaign about?

„This election will be tighter than previous ones, we are facing an open-ended election”, Viktor Orbán said at a rally held for his own activists in Mezőtúr. This statement is surprising because, until now, he has never spoken about the possibility of a Fidesz election defeat.

As recently as last summer, Viktor Orbán still claimed to be leading in 80 out of the 106 electoral constituencies. At the beginning of 2026, his rhetoric shifted: he said Fidesz could win in 65 constituencies, which is an open admission that Fidesz has weakened.

It was also unexpected when, during a press conference with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, he spoke about handing over power if he loses the election. “Sometimes I win, and sometimes I lose. There is no question about what happens if we lose, as this has happened regularly. One shouldn’t fear what will happen to Hungary if this occurs.”

According to my Fidesz sources,

Read more

1. What is the campaign about?

2. What do the numbers show?

3. Behind the scenes at Tisza

4. Behind the scenes at Fidesz

5. Who seems to be the frontrunner now?

1. What is the campaign about?

„Errors, lagging behind, phase delay and apology” – this is how a Fidesz politician and multi-term MP complained to me about the campaign of Fidesz. Neither this MP nor the voters can sense the professionalism that once defined Fidesz.

Some examples mentioned:

· Domain blunder: Fidesz announced its new slogan “The sure choice” at its congress, implying that Viktor Orbán can guarantee peace, security and stability. However, the Fidesz campaign team failed to register the domain name for the slogan, enabling Péter Magyar to launch a powerful counter-campaign: “Fidesz is the sure choice for corrupt oligarchs”.

· Snow situation: while Hungary was dealing with its heaviest snowfall in a long time, Viktor Orbán was posting videos of himself calling the Minister of Interior from his warm office. Meanwhile, Péter Magyar was out in the cold distributing firewood to those in need, demanding immediate action regarding the firewood supply―the sole source of heat for the poorest. The government first claimed no action was needed, but then announced its firewood program a week later.

· An apology: Transport Minister János Lázár, often mentioned as Orbán’s potential successor, has had to apologize for his remarks on several occasions. Now, at one of his public appearances, he said that if no one was willing to clean the ‘shitty toilets’ on trains, the ‘Gypsies’ would have to be brought in to do the job. Given that this caused huge outrage even among Fidesz-aligned influencers, he apologized two days later. Lázár can only guess how much damage he has caused to Fidesz.

János Lázár (center) at the Fidesz event before the apology

In the meantime, Péter Magyar has demonstrated his readiness to govern. Tisza has been joined by several experts whom voters could envision as ministers in a future Magyar cabinet.

· István Kapitány, a former Global Vice President of Shell, has been introduced as Tisza’s expert on economy and energy affairs. According to my information, the party intends for him to head a ‘super-ministry’: if appointed, his portfolio will include domestic economy, foreign trade and energy affairs.

· Anita Orbán has been named as Tisza’s foreign affairs expert and minister-designate (she is not related to the PM Orbán). She is a former Head of Government Relations at Vodafone Global with previous experience at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the second Orbán-cabinet. In her first public statement, she set the goal of strengthening Western and Euro-Atlantic relations.

Péter Magyar, Anita Orbán and Istán Kapitány

In February, Tisza will continue presenting its experts and its comprehensive program.

2. What do the numbers show?

The results of the first party-preference surveys in January again showed two opposite worlds. Government-aligned think tanks (Nézőpont Intézet /Institute, Alapjogokért Intézet / Center for Fundamental Rights, XXI. Század Intézet / 21st Century Institute) published a straightforward government lead, while the institutes independent from the government (Medián, IDEA) measured a confident victory of the opposition.

Conclusions based on all the research:

Read more

Based on feedback, Hungarian domestic politics is of interest to many non-Hungarian-speaking readers, including diplomats, business leaders and journalists. Therefore, ahead of the 2026 elections, I have now launched a new English-language newsletter in which I write about the behind-the-scenes secrets of Hungarian politics. Twice a month, I write about how Viktor Orbán and Péter Magyar view the political situation, as well as which events, statements, and research in Hungary are really worth paying attention to.

I am in constant contact with politicians and behind-the-scenes figures from both the ruling party and the opposition. Naturally, this information and the conclusions that can be drawn from it always appear in the newsletter. Based on this information from Fidesz and Tisza, I also analyze who seems to have the best chance of winning the election.

It is a novelty in Hungarian politics that the election is wide open. For the first time in 20 years, Viktor Orbán’s victory is not a foregone conclusion. In this English-language newsletter, I do not aim to cover every single event in Hungarian politics; instead, I focus on the primary issue: the struggle between Viktor Orbán and his main challenger, Péter Magyar.

In my analyses, I examine how to interpret opinion polls and which statements or issues are worth paying attention to. This is more than just a simple news commentary; I gather “ammunition” from background conversations with politicians and party inner circles to reveal the strategies being pursued.

What is the campaign about?

Imagine a speeding train whose goal is to overtake another robust train that has been dashing along for sixteen years.

By the end of last year, it became clear exactly which key narratives the two political forces would use to frame events. On New Year’s Eve, Viktor Orbán designated his focus: he wants to place the war at the center of the campaign. “In 2026, I am asking for a mandate from Hungarians to stay out of the European war. I would like to ask them to authorize me to ensure that Hungary stays out of the war.”

In the first minutes of the New Year, Péter Magyar placed the election in a completely different framework: according to him, the vote is about Viktor Orbán and what he calls his corrupt system. “This year’s election will not be a competition between parties, but a serene and peaceful, yet decisive referendum. A referendum on whether we want to live in Orbán’s Hungary or in a humane homeland.”

What do the numbers show?

In Hungary, we can see two different worlds — not only in politics, but also in polling. Research institutes operating on government contracts (Nézőpont, Századvég, Magyar Társadalomkutató, Real-PR 93, Center for Fundamental Rights, 21st Century Institute) publish data showing a Fidesz lead. Meanwhile, independent institutes largely supported by opposition commissions (Medián, 21 Research Center, Republikon, Závecz Research, Publicus, IDEA Institute) measure a Tisza lead.

If we juxtapose the data, it is clear that someone is not being truthful. Orbán and Magyar cannot be in the lead simultaneously. However, there are a few findings that can be stated concerning all research:

• According to every poll, Tisza has grown over the past year, while Fidesz has stagnated.

• No one has measured a decrease for Tisza over the year, meaning that its voter enthusiasm remains high.

• In the last election, in 2022, Fidesz defeated the opposition 54 to 34. At that time, four months before the election, every institute—including those favoring the opposition—indicated a large Fidesz lead. That is not the case now.

These data points are favorable for Péter Magyar because there is no sign of uncertainty among Tisza voters, and even government-aligned polls show Tisza above 40% and Fidesz below 50%.

Behind the Scenes at Tisza

Returning to the train analogy, Magyar recognized his task a year ago: he must constantly pick up new passengers from other trains, even the Fidesz train; he must find people and co-leaders for the locomotive; and he must build the train’s structure and organization while in motion. Most importantly, he must keep racing; he cannot stop for a moment because if he brakes, the passengers will fall off. This is why he did not slow down in 2025.

His main task for 2026 is whether he can position himself at Viktor Orbán’s level—as a potential Prime Minister—and whether voters see Tisza as a viable alternative capable of governing. It is because of this positioning that he uses similar tools to Orbán, holding press conferences in parallel with him and bringing a figure of Viktor Orbán to his forums.

What is Magyar focusing on in the campaign?

• Activating and mobilizing his own base: Through constant proactivity and his ability to control the agenda, Magyar has ensured that his base does not waver when Fidesz attacks. He must maintain this.

• Destabilizing the opponent’s camp: Magyar has been continuously penetrating the ideological and geographical territories of Fidesz, organizing forums outside Hungary, in small villages where Fidesz is strong, as well as addressing child protection—previously a Fidesz-exclusive topic.

• Persuading the undecided: In the segment of 500,000–700,000 undecided voters, there are more women; Magyar will tailor his upcoming messages to them.

Behind the Scenes at Fidesz

Continuing the analogy: in the second half of 2025, Orbán felt he had to take control of the Fidesz train and shift to a higher speed, otherwise the Tisza train would overtake him.

Orbán faces two major problems:

• The political trend favors Péter Magyar, as polls show that more than half of Hungarians would replace Viktor Orbán.

• The economic trend also works against Orbán. GDP is not growing, inflation is rising, and investment is low. According to my background information, Orbán had expected economic growth of over 3% by the end of 2025, but this did not happen.

In recent months, Orbán wanted to change these trends. Fidesz has set the following goals:

• Improving the economic situation and the public mood: A year ago, Fidesz was certain that a recovery would follow the difficult years in the economy. They hoped for a swift peace deal after Donald Trump’s inauguration, and also expected new political winds from Europe following the change in the US. However, over the last year, Fidesz had to be disappointed. Orbán realized that improving the public mood requires more, so he came forward with several new promises: subsidized loans for first-time homebuyers (Otthon Start) and a “14th-month” pension (in February, pensioners receive their 13th-month pension plus an additional week’s worth). In short, Orbán will continue to distribute and promise more money during the campaign.

• Regaining control of the agenda: Orbán believes the agenda is no longer decided by traditional media but by social media, so he is focusing more on the latter. This is why he appointed Balázs Orbán to lead the campaign and promoted János Lázár. According to my information, in the event of a victory, Orbán intends to rely primarily on János Lázár and Péter Szijjártó rather than Antal Rogán.

• Making his own lead theme exclusive: Orbán has owed all his two-thirds victories to Fidesz’s ability to define the main theme of the campaign (2010: “the past eight years”; 2014: utility cost cuts; 2018: migration; 2022: peace and “going forward”). A year ago, Fidesz believed it would fight the election battle in 2026 along the fault line of “national interests versus the interests of Brussels”. However, internal research showed voters were more interested in their livelihoods than Ukraine or sovereignty; Fidesz’s popularity weakened, and certain steps even led to internal debates (the Sovereignty Protection Act had to be taken off the agenda). Orbán switched here too: while the Ukraine issue remained in the autumn politics of Fidesz, they brought the issue of the “war” back to the fore, and launched smear campaigns against Tisza, resonating with cost-of-living fears. With this, Fidesz halted its decline and ensured that by the end of 2025, we can still speak of a “two-horse race.”

Who seems more likely to win?

Regarding victory chances, Fidesz has a massive resource advantage: more money, the ability to distribute targeted funds from the budget, and the power to use its two-thirds majority at any time—even in the final days. They also have greater experience in mobilization and as an organization.

Magyar’s advantage, however, is that the political growth trend and the poor economic situation favor him. Magyar can win if the campaign is not about Tisza’s program or his own suitability for the role of Prime Minister, but about what he calls Viktor Orbán’s “untenable” governance.

The 2026 election result, therefore, depends on which question the voters ask. If they fear an uncertain new government, Orbán will prevail. If they pass judgment on Orbán’s governance, Magyar will win.

Based on feedback, Hungarian domestic politics is of interest to many non-Hungarian-speaking readers, including diplomats, business leaders and journalists. Therefore, ahead of the 2026 elections, I have now launched a new English-language newsletter in which I write about the behind-the-scenes secrets of Hungarian politics.

Twice a month, I write about how Viktor Orbán and Péter Magyar view the political situation, as well as which events, statements, and research in Hungary are really worth paying attention to.

I am in constant contact with politicians and behind-the-scenes figures from both the ruling party and the opposition. Naturally, this information and the conclusions that can be drawn from it always appear in the newsletter. Based on this information from Fidesz and Tisza, I also analyze who seems to have the best chance of winning the election.

I have always been interested in the background of politics: that is why I became a journalist and why I studied law. This is what I have been asking about, writing about, and talking about for the past 15 years as a reporter for public radio, former editor-in-chief of Index, and then as one of the founders and editor-in-chief of Telex.

The aim of the Decoding Hungarian Politics newsletter is to help non-Hungarian readers better understand what is happening in Hungarian politics.

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